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Mr . President :

~)

President Eisenhower' s original
Middle East

,u;~~J
1

had ~two

basic weaknesses .

proposa~on

the

In the first place,

it distorted the Constitutional principle of separation of
powers .

In the second place, the manner in which it was

presented was such as to suggest a bold new policy, a new
Doctrine for dealing with the grave problems of the Middle
East .

In fact, the approach is not new and the problems

of the Middle East are touched hardly at all by the resolution.
The actions of

~

the~gent±emen

of the combined com-

mittees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations and the
initiative of the able Senator from Minnesota

L Mr .

Humphre,V"

have helped to correct the first weakness in the President ' s
proposal, the Constitutional weakness .
The amended resolution - Senate Joint Resolution 19 the version which has come from the Committees, is similar to
the President ' s in one respect .

It states at least as clearly

that this country regards as vital to our national interests
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and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity
of the nations of the Middle East.

It states at least as clearly

the determination of the United States to use whatever legitimate
means may be necessary to prevent armed aggression from destroying the independence and integrity of those nations.
Yet there is a difference.
but it is an enormous difference.

It is a difference in words

It does not affect the pur-

poses of the resolution which is to forestall communist domination of the Middle East.
purpose.

On the contrary, it strengthens that

It does affect, however,

and it affects most pro-

foundly, the Constitutional processes by which this purpose
shall be pursued.

Under the original version, Congress was

asked to "authorize" the President to use armed forces in the
Middle East.

That is the word vThich was employed.

version strikes
resolution.

The Committee

(

-~
'

that~dangerous

Constitutional concept from the

It places responsibility for the use of armed

forces, short of a declaration of war, more definitely where
it belongs under the Constitution - on the President alone.

- 3Is this a mere quibbling over words, Mr . President?
do not believe it is.
it.

I

I . do not believe the Senate will so regard

We sball not so regard it if we stop to consider tbat in

almost 170 years of Constitutional practice, the Formosa resolution and this resolution are, so far as I am aware, the only
cases in which a President has asked Congress in this fashion
for authority to employ the armed forces prior to a Declaration
of War .

Yet the armed forces bave been used nany tires through-

out our history without a Declaration of War .

Mr . President, if

~

in~l70

years of Constituti onal

practice there are only two cases of this kind , both under the
same President and both in the last few years, then it ought
hA'~~

to be clear tbat this change which the

CommitteeS~~e

valve s far nnre than a rere quibbling over words .

in-

Wbat is in-

valved is more fundamental than the action we nay or may not
take in the Middle East crisis.

It is a matter which goes to

the heart of our system of governrent.

-4I realize, Mr. President, that in trying to clarify
this matter, the Committees were dealing with a very difficult
question.

It may not be possible to ever draw with words that

precise point at which the President's responsibilities as
Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces is divided from the
Congressional authority to declare war.

It is a distinction

that lies in a twilight zone of power between the Executive and
Legislative Branches of the government.
The Committees' effort, however, has the merit of

pv~~·\ 'o\'/
reversing theKdangerous precedent set by the Formosa resolution
several years ago, a precedent which would have been affirmed
by the acceptance of the President's version of the pending
resolution.

Carried to a logical extreme, these precedents

of Congress "authorizing" the President "to use armed forces"
could have only two possible outcomes.
I speak now not of what would be likely to happen
today or tomorrow or next year but of the decades that lie ahead.
It is the responsibility of each Senator individually and of the

-5Senate as a whole to measure actions taken by this body not
only against the needs of the hour but for the long future
when others will have to live with the consequences of our
acts.
Carried to a logical conclusion, these precedents
of authorizing the President to use the armed forces could
lead on the one hand to this result.

They could eventually

convert a fundamental power of the Presidency - the power to
command the armed forces - into a Congressional function.

If

the President comes to us now for permission to order the
armed forces to fire if necessary in the Middle East how long
will it be before other Presidents will feel impelled to come
to Congress for permission to move the armed forces to the
firing line?

How long before it will be necessary to have

Congressional permission to move a naval vessel or transfer a
soldier out of an American port? Where would this trend leave
the country 1n a nuclear age when instant decisions by the
President may be necessary?

-6Reduced to their logical but ludicrous extreme, these
precedents lead to the placing of members of Congress or their
agents on every ship, plane and in every ground unit of the
armed forces.
happen.

Of course, I do not believe that is going to

I do say, however, that if we were to continue to build

up these precedents of authorizing the President to use the armed
•
forces we would be bringing about slowly, almost itrPercept~bly,

fundamental changes in our system of government.

We would be

moving it, in the examples I have just cited in the direction
of a Parliamentary form of government, with the President reduced
either to a figure-head or a mere agent of Congress.
That then is one possible outcome of repeated actions
by the Congress "authorizing" the President "to use armed forces".
There is still another.

In "authorizing", the Congress accepts

responsibility for the actions which will be taken pursuant to
, the aut her izati on.

In short, it takes responsibility for

actions which have not yet taken place and whose nature it
cannot anticipate.

It accepts responsibility for whatever

-

'

.-

-7use the President sees fit to make of the armed forces, although
it bas no control over those uses.

In effect, it approves

t~se

uses in advance whether they are wise uses or foolish uses.
Congress, in short) impairs its right of independent criticism
and correction.

It invites the irresponsible use of Executive

power by sharing responsibility in matters over which it has
no control and little specific knowledge.

At the end of that

road lies Executive tyranny.
I do not suggest that under Mr. Eisenhower we are going
to reach that extreme anymore than we are going to find ourselves
suddenly functioning under a Parliamentary system of government.
I do say, however, that both possibilities were implicit in the
language of the original resolution.
I know that the Senate shares my conviction that the
form of government under which we live is worth preserving beyond
the lifetimes of the President or any of us in the Senate.

That

is why I believe the Co~ttees of the Senate were not quibbling

.-

-8when they altered the language in the pending resolution. They
were performing a distinguished service by removing a Constitutional
weakness from the original version.
The President came to Congress for authority to use
the armed forces prior to a Declaration of War.

By this change,

the Committees have reminded the President that only the Constitution can give him that authority.
The President came to Congress with a request that it
assume responsibility for actions which may involve the use of
armed forces short of a Declaration of War.

The Committees

have reminded him that only he can assume that responsibility.

